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MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION
RICHARD

S. KAY*

The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find
such plain sailing, I can't navigate. I'm no voyager. But in the
thickets of the law, oh, there I'm a forester.'
In the Statesman Plato considers the art of government. At
one point the Eleatic Stranger, Plato's primary interlocutor,
argues that the sole criterion for true government is whether the
governors possess the "royal science." Everything else is irrelevant: "[W]hether they rule according to law or without law,
over willing or unwilling subjects, and are rich or poor themselves-none of these things can with any propriety be included
in the notion of the ruler."' 2 On this point his student, young
Socrates, raises a rare if mild demur suggesting that "as to their
ruling without laws-the expression has a harsh sound."' 3 In
response the Stranger puts the case of a physician who departs
upon a long journey and leaves a written set of instructions for
his patients. Should he return earlier than expected no one
would want him to adhere to his written rules if he thought that
"owing to an unexpected change of the winds or other celestial
influences" 4 those rules no longer offered the greatest promise of
cure. Similarly, any rules laid down by the political "physician"
must, given the "endless irregular movements of human
things,"' 5 be inferior to the unfettered judgment of the wise ruler.
And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten, determining
what was good or bad, honourable or dishonourable, just or
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. I am grateful to John Noyes and
Carol Weisbrod for helpful suggestions.
1. R. BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 66 (1962).
2. PLATO, Statesman, in 3 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 465, 508 (B. Jowett trans. 4th
ed. 1953). The passage quoted is found at 293c-d of the standard reference numerals to the

dialogue. (Hereinafter citations will be to Statesman, followed by the standard reference
and the page number in the Jowett translation.) Charles McIlwain discussed the relevance

of Plato's discussion in Statesman to issues of constitutionalism in C. MCILWAIN,
CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 28-35 (rev. ed. 1947).
3. Statesman, supra note 2, 293e, at 509.
4. Id. 295d, at 511.
5. Id. 294b, at 509.
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unjust, to the tribes of men who flock together in their several
cities, and are governed in accordance with them; if, I say, this
expert author of laws were suddenly to come again, or another
like to him, is he to be prohibited from changing them?-would
not this prohibition be in reality quite as ridiculous as the
other?6

Of course, the Stranger's judgment that the returning governor may act independently of the rules depends on an assumption that the returning governor is a true statesman, that he
possesses the royal science. The Stranger and young Socrates
agree that such rulers are very rare. In the more common situation, when there is no such statesman, the society can do no
more than resort to a "second-best procedure."' 7 It is necessary,
then, "to meet and compose written laws, endeavouring, as it
seems, to approach as nearly as they can to the true form of
government."' 8 "The laws would be copies of the true particulars of action as far as they admit of being written down from the
lips of those who have knowledge." 9 But such law-governed
polities are, at best, imitations of states in which the ruler governs "inthe spirit of virtue and knowledge, and... dispense[s]
what is due to all, justly and holly." 10 Thus, Plato never abandoned the view that the only truly worthy goal was a city "in
which kings are either philosophers or gods." 11
6. Id. 296a, at 511.
7. Id. 297e, at 513.
8. Id. 301e, at 518.
9. Id. 300c, at 516.
10. Id. 301d, at 518.
11. B. Jowett, Statesman: Introduction and Analysis, in 3 THE DIALOGUES OF
PLATO, supra note 2, at 429. Commentators have remarked that Plato views law with
increasing favor in his later work. He shows total trust in the wisdom of the philosopherrulers in Republic, acknowledges the necessity of rule by law in the absence of a qualified
person in Statesman, and finally embraces the rule of law in Laws. See, e.g., Plato, Laws, in
4 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra, 715d, at 285 [hereinafter Laws] ("[T]he state in which
the law is above the rulers, and the rulers are the inferiors of the law, is preserved, and has
every blessing which the Gods can confer."); R. HALL, PLATO 100-01 (1981). Even in
Laws, however, Plato's acceptance of rules is only the byproduct of an increasing
skepticism that real statesmen could be found or that states would accept them if they were
found:
For if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the
truth, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order
which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without impiety, be deemed the subject
or slave of any man, but rather the lord of all. I speak of mind, true and free, and
in full possession of its nature. But then there is no such mind anywhere, or at
least not much; and therefore we must choose law and order, which are second
best. These look at things as they exist for the most part, but are unable to take
account of every case.
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This discussion in Statesman summarizes succinctly the
opposition between government by ad hoe decision and government by fixed rule. That opposition is an ineradicable presence
in the continuing academic debate over the nature of constitutional law in the United States. Most modern commentators
reject adjudication that consists of the application of rigid
abstract rules. Instead, they prefer one or another model in
which the judge actively brings to bear his critical thinking,
intelligence, and moral sensitivity in the decision of each case. 12
Like the Eleatic Stranger, such writers disparage the former
approach, in part, because static rules must necessarily fail to
take account of the inevitable "irregular movements of human
things."13 And also like the Eleatic Stranger, these writers must
suppose that there is some other, non-rule-based technique for
molding the character of government, a science of public decisionmaking-a royal science. Moreover, this science is not limited to choosing the most effective or efficient means of
implementing goals formulated elsewhere in society. It encompasses as well the selection of the proper ends of state and society. Royal science must be moral science.
Michael Perry's Morality, Politics, and Law is an exceptionally valuable and perspicuous contribution to the continuing discussion of the relationship between moral philosophy and
constitutional adjudication. The book is not limited to this single issue, however. It also deals intelligently and insightfully
with more general questions of morality and with other varieties
of public decisionmaking. I wish to deal here, however, only
with the implications of Perry's argument for the duty of judges
in assessing the validity of government actions. Any prescription for judicial review that denies both that the textual or
intended meaning of the words of the Constitution is the sole
measure of validity and that constitutional decisions should be
made according to the arbitrary preferences of the judges is
bound to come up against the problem that Perry confronts in
this book. That position inescapably entails some right and
Laws, supra, 875c, at 443-44; see G. KLOSKO, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLATO'S POLITICAL
THEORY 198-200 (1986).

12. See, eg., JudicialReview versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Judicial
Review and the Constitution-The Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 443 (1983).
13. Statesman, supra note 2, 294b, at 509; see, eg., Brest, The Misconceived Questfor
the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 229 (1980); Moore, A Natural Law
Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 357 (1985); cf E. BARKER, GREEK
POLrTCAL THEORY: PLATO AND HIS PREDECESSORS 278-79 (3d ed. 1947).
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wrong of public action independent of the conventional criteria
of positive law. It is not surprising, therefore, that modem constitutional commentary has become increasingly explicit
in rec14
ognizing the need for some form of moral knowledge.
Like most of his contemporaries, Michael Perry has found
historically defined, text-bound limitations on the power of judicial review unacceptable. 5 Unlike some of them, however, he
makes no attempt to dodge the implications of that finding. In
Morality, Politics, and Law he has forcefully carried the reasons
supporting his preference to their logical conclusion: Judges
engaged in constitutional adjudication should make explicitly
moral decisions. This is not to say, however, that they should do
what they please. For Perry, decisionmaking unconstrained by
positive law is not arbitrary because moral decisionmaking is not
arbitrary. Some decisions are morally-and, therefore, legallyright, and some are wrong. This forthright exposition poses the
most cogent kind of challenge to the standard model of decisionmaking according to positive law because it strikes at the very
foundation of that model-the value of rule-governed behavior.
Perry skillfully canvasses much of the voluminous philosophical literature, but his own claim about moral knowledge
turns out to be quite modest. Moral beliefs, he asserts, are
derived from views of human good, and those views are
grounded in moral communities and traditions. 16 Those communities and traditions, however, are diverse, and few can be
disqualified as fostering a conception of the good utterly incompatible with human nature. Consequently, we can only hope to
"identify a range of equally acceptable (unacceptable?) ways of
14. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1977) (arguing for a
"fusion of constitutional law and moral theory"); Richards, Moral Philosophy and the
Searchfor Fundamental Values in ConstitutionalLaw, 42 OHIO ST. L.L 319 (1981).

15. Perry argues that there is a connection between the constitutional text and the
form of adjudication he defends and that it is, therefore, entitled to be regarded as
constitutional interpretation. As I will discuss further in the text, the judicial role
described by Perry is the elaboration and application of fundamental political-moral
aspirations contained in the constitutional text. The language of the Constitution is
consistent with these aspirations, so the "aspirational meaning" has as much claim to the
authority of the text as the originally intended meaning. See M. PERRY, MORALITY,
POLITICS, AND LAW 132-36 (1988). I do not wish to discuss Perry's invocation of the
authority of the text here, except to say that it seems to me problematic because it cuts the
text off from the source of its legal authority in the first place, the intentional exercise of
human will that comprised the constitution-making act. See Kay, Original Intentions,
Standard Meanings, and the Legal Character of the Constitution, 6 CONST. CoMM. 39

(1989).
16. M. PERRY, supra note 15, at 128-33.
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life and, beyond that, to achieve an ever more sensitive understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of different ways
of life." 17 While the existence of some relevant shared beliefs
creates the possibility of "productive moral discourse," 18 Perry
acknowledges that in America's pluralistic society "moral discourse often runs out before agreement---consensus-is
reached."' 19 His claim, then, turns out to be not so much the
existence of moral facts, but only the hopeful prospect for moral
communication.20
Perry does assert a stronger claim for correct moral answers
in the more limited context of constitutional adjudication.
There he is able to identify the particular moral community
whose values inform the decision: the "constitutional community." This community includes "those persons and groups in
the morally pluralistic society who share a commitment to the
aspirations signified by the constitutional text,"'2 ' including the
aspirations of "the freedoms of speech, press, and religion, due
process of law, and equal protection of the laws."22 Although
these shared aspirations are admittedly indeterminate in applicaher
tion, they provide a sufficient basis for a judge to "rely on
'23
own beliefs as to what the [relevant] aspiration requires.
It should be obvious that not even this somewhat limited
view of the role of moral knowledge in constitutional adjudication is likely to convince many skeptics.24 But even if right and
wrong answers to questions of constitutional morality exist,
there is still much that is troublesome in Perry's model of judicial review. Perry makes it clear that the constitutional aspirations which provide the basis for judgment are indeterminate
and that invoking those aspirations cannot reveal unique and
self-evident conclusions about proper and improper government
It follows that the judicial activity prescribed is
behavior.
bound to be relatively unpredictable26 and controversial.27
17. Id at 48-49.
18. Id. at 50.
19. Id. at 77.
20. Id. at 103.
21. d at 158.
22. Id. at 154.
23. Id. at 149 (emphasis in original).
24. See, e.g., S.LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FArrH 72-74 (1988); Leff, Unspeakable
Ethics, UnnaturalLaw, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229; Reynolds, Originalismand the Separationof
Powers, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1541 (1989).
25. M. PERRY, supra note 15, at 155-57.
26. Relative, that is, to other more limited models of adjudication. The most
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This problem is evident on examining the program of constitutional adjudication that Perry sets forth. It appears to
require at least six separate steps. The "correct" execution of
each of these steps will be open to fairly radical dispute. First,
and probably least problematic, the judge must identify the constitutional provisions that bear on the question at issue. Second,
he must decide whether any of the relevant provisions are associated with a "fundamental aspiration." Not all the parts of the
Constitution have such an association. The first amendment
does. The requirement that each House of Congress keep a journal presumably does not.2" Third, he must determine what the
associated fundamental aspirations are. These aspirations
change and develop. The judge must define the aspiration as it
has "emerged over time-in the course of constitutional adjudication and, more generally, of political discourse. ' 29 Fourth, a
judge must determine whether the aspiration or aspirations so
identified are worthwhile. 30 The fundamental aspiration associated with some constitutional provisions, for example, may be
the maintenance of human slavery. 31 Fifth, the judge must bring
any worthwhile aspirational meaning, so determined, to bear on
the problem at hand, to decide "what that aspiration, if
accepted, requires the court to do, if anything, with respect to
the conflict at hand."32 Finally, having answered all the previous questions, a judge must still decide whether to restrain himself in a given case and withhold judgment. Such abstention
would be appropriate, for example, when a judge is not confident
enough in his own conclusion to overrule a presumed contrary
decision by a legislature, when the matter is relatively unimporprominent alternative discussed in Perry's work is "originalism": the application of the
meaning of the rules originally intended by the constitutional enactors. That technique is
not free from uncertainty but, as a comparative matter, it appears far more certain than
nonoriginalist models in general and Perry's in particular. See generally Kay, Adherence to
the OriginalIntentions in ConstitutionalAdjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82
Nw. U.L. Rv. 226 (1988).

27. Persistent disagreement in practice is not inconsistent with the assumption that
there are morally correct and incorrect answers to the questions posed by constitutional
adjudication. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 280-81.
28. See M. PERRY, supra note 15, at 133, 288-89 n.55.
29. Id. at 133.
30. Id. at 134-35.
31. If a judge finds no fundamental aspiration associated with a provision, or that it is
not a worthwhile aspiration, he should then apply only the originally intended meaning.
Id. at 135.
32. Id. at 136.
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tant, or when judicial action might precipitate a public crisis.33
Moreover, throughout all of these choices, although the judge
ought to consult such factors as the originally intended meaning
and prior judicial decisions, in the final analysis she "should rely
on her own beliefs as to what the aspiration requires.""
This sketch of the suggested process of constitutional interpretation and decisionmaking makes plain what Perry freely
concedes: The results will be unpredictable and imprecise.
Serious and honest disagreements can and will emerge at every
stage of the process. Consequently it will be extremely difficult
to gauge in advance whether a particular instance of governmental activity will be held valid or invalid. Any attempt to build
more predictability into the process would limit the judges' ability to follow what they believe to be the correct implications of
constitutional morality. Thus, the unfettered pursuit of that
morality comes with a significant cost-a constitutional law that
is uncertain and unstable. It is a real question, then, even
assuming Perry is correct on the larger conceptual issue of the
existence of moral knowledge, whether the benefits that may be
derived from the process of moral inquiry prescribed for constitutional adjudication are worth that cost.
The costs of uncertainty in morality-based adjudication are
significant. The shared aspirations that comprise the "constitutional morality" that Perry describes are exceedingly general.3 5
Indeed, only their generality makes plausible the claim that they
are shared.36 While they may provide a basis for intelligible
argument about their application to particular cases, their capaciousness also increases the likelihood that, as a practical matter,
such argument will remain unresolved, with each participant
still firmly and reasonably convinced of the correctness of his
position. Moreover, the very centrality of those aspirations in
the traditions of our society can lead to a vehemence of conviction that itself can strain the other common ties of the community.3 7 The continuing acrimonious and sometimes violent
dissension associated with attempted judicial management of
questions of abortion, religious observances in schools, demonstrations by unpopular groups, and school busing provide the
33. See id. at 170-71.
34. Id. at 149 (emphasis in original).
35. "[F]or example, the freedoms of speech, press, and religion, due process of law,
and equal protection of the laws." Id. at 154.
36. Id. at 155.
37. See S. LEVINSON, supra note 24, at 125.
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most obvious examples. Ongoing, evolving, and highly uncertain judicial-moral responses to these constitutional questions
surely inflict some injury on social peace and cohesion.
Morality, Politics, and Law does not extensively treat the
effects of such a morality-based adjudication on the stability and
predictability of law, or, therefore, its effects on order in society
generally. 38 But in his discussion of the place of rules in moral
reasoning, Perry does not put a particularly high value on those
characteristics. He explains that general rules of morality are
valuable only as "memoranda of particulars ' ' 39 and, therefore,
that moral rules have no force independent of the prior moral
experience they embody. Highly determinate rules, therefore,
are flawed because they bring the judgments of past situations to
bear on new and necessarily different ones.
The point, rather, is that given the priority of the particular,
relative determinacy often ought not to be a goal. Relative
determinacy is not a principal virtue either of moral rules or of
the beliefs they represent. To achieve relative determinacy...
"is to secure a measure of certainty or predictability at the cost
of blindly prejudging what is to be done in a range of future
cases, about whose composition we are ignorant."'
Of course, when translated to a discussion of legal rules,
this estimate of the importance or unimportance of "relative
determinacy" is, at least, controversial. Certainly, one wellestablished view of the utility of constitutional rules is that they
secure a class of expectations from arbitrary and unpredictable
interference by the state. It is exactly because people do not
trust the fresh day-to-day decisionmaking of ordinary governmental officials that we settle at least some important matters in
advance, more or less permanently, immune from the discretionary judgment of public authorities. For the creators of the
American Constitution, at any rate, a critical objective was to fix
the Constitution, to ensure that there were limits beyond which
the state would not go. 41 This conception of the Constitution is
a particular application of the more general virtue associated
with the phrase "the rule of law" or sometimes, more descrip38. Perry devotes much more attention to the argument that his position is

inconsistent with democracy. See M. PERRY, supra note 15, at 128-30, 163-72.
39. Id. at 35 (citing R. BAMBROUGH, MORAL SCEPTICISM AND MORAL
KNOWLEDGE 130, 137-38 (1979)).
40. Id. at 38 (quoting H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126 (1961)) (emphasis in

original) (footnote omitted).,
41. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 290-91 (1977).
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tively, "the rule of law and not men." 42 It seems quite clear that
ceterisparibussome "relative determinacy" in the law, and especially in the law of the Constitution, is an important value.
Plainly, however, determinacy is not the only worthwhile
value to be pursued by a legal system. No one would suggest
that it trumps every consideration of substance. A clear, stable
set of legal rules that embody oppressive or stupid judgments
about the relative rights and powers of individuals and states
would not be desirable merely because they are determinate.
Furthermore, any system of rules that excludes the possibility of
substantive changes in response to changed circumstances in
society is quite likely to become stupid and oppressive over time.
The question becomes one of trading off costs and benefits. How
much determinacy
will we buy at the cost of how much
43
substance?
The process of adjudication put forth by Michael Perry
argues strongly for substance. The principal end he seeks to foster is not the stability of constitutional limits but the capacity for
moral growth in society. The judges are moral "interlocutors of
the political community and its elected representatives," ' forcing those other political actors to consider what might otherwise
be neglected moral questions. The judges thereby contribute to
a "deliberative, transformative politics," 45 valuable not merely as
an instrument for social moral improvement but as a good in
itself.
This picture is attractive and can hardly fail to appeal to
people who believe in the value of reason and self-criticism. But
it neglects important aspects of constitutional adjudication.
Judicial review is more than part of an ongoing national discussion. The resolution of constitutional issues by the judiciary
may, indeed, stimulate and enrich moral debate on such important and difficult social-political questions as those involving
matters of privacy and race. If the decisions of courts were
merely occasions for abstract discussions of contested questions
of political morality, any instability and confusion resulting from
their consideration would be fairly harmless and maybe even
helpful. But those decisions also resolve real disputes between
42. See, e.g., E. BARKER, supra note 13, at 279; F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF

148-53 (1960).
43. See Kay, PreconstitutionalRules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 201-03 (1981).
44. M. PERRY, supra note 15, at 159.
45. Id.

LIBERTY
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real human beings. Whatever other benefits ultimately accrue to
the polity, for the involved parties the results of the decision of a
constitutional case will be specific, palpable, and dramatic,
involving, sometimes literally, life or death.
Moreover, Supreme Court decisions have an important
impact beyond the immediate parties. They create rules of law
that may affect the lives of large numbers of people. Of course,
constitutional decisions may be reversed by amendment or by
overruling. As a practical matter, however (and as Perry
acknowledges), they are usually unchangeable at least in the
short and medium terms. In some cases, that may well be forever. 4 6 One commentator has asserted that in the four years following the judgment in Roe v. Wade, 47 a decision that Perry
agrees was overly broad even by his criteria, 48 a million additional abortions were performed.4 9 It is hard to escape the conclusion that constitutional adjudication is more than
discursive.50
46. Perry argues that history has shown that in the long run a tension between a
judicial determination and contrary public sentiment will be resolved in favor of the latter.
He also recognizes that the amount of time that passes before such a "correction" occurs is
one serious factor in evaluating any conception of judicial review. See id. at 169, 300-01
nn.168-73.
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
48. See M. PERRY, supra note 15, at 172-78.
49.

J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES

65-66 (1979) (citing Tietze, Induced Abortion: 1977 Supplement, in 14 POPULATION
COUNCIL, REPORTS ON POPULATION/FAMILY PLANNING (2d ed. Supp. 6 1977)). It is
extremely difficult to obtain an estimate of the total number of induced abortions, legal and
illegal, performed in the United States prior to Roe. A 1957 inquiry concluded that the
annual number could be as low as 200,000 or as high as 1,200,000. The figure of 1,000,000
"gained wide acceptance" in the 1960s and was compatible with subsequent studies. See C.
TIETZE & S. HENSHAW, INDUCED ABORTIONS: A WORLD REVIEW 43-44 (6th ed. 1986).
Legal abortions in the United States in 1985 were estimated at 1,588,550. ALAN
GUTTMACHER INST., ABORTION SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, EACH STATE &

METROPOLITAN AREA 106, Table 8 (1988). Of course these figures do not prove that Roe
caused the increase. I recognize that the extent of the impact of legal rules on behavior is
sometimes controverted. See generally L. FRIEDMAN & S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 193-575 (2d ed. 1977). On the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of
Supreme Court judgments in changing behavior, see J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 140-50 (1980).
50. Adjudication in the sense that Perry conceives it is lawmaking. Such lawmaking
is effective because the judgments it embodies are backed by the tangible authority of the
state. That is, in our legal system, official adjudication is essentially coercive. See S.
LEVINSON, supra note 24, at 79-80; Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 40-44 (1983); Maltz, The Supreme Court and the Quality of PoliticalDialogue, 5
CONST. COMM. 375, 380 (1988). Perry makes a number of sensitive and convincing
arguments for why we should always be cautious about employing the coercive power of
the state through legislative action. See M. PERRY, supra note 15, at 98-104. I believe
those arguments also apply to judicial lawmaking.
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Even if we only consider the courts as participants in a process that criticizes and defines our moral values, the practical
power of the courts to define our legal rules may make that participation less attractive. That is because the dialogue that Perry
proposes will not be a conversation among equals. As I have
noted, the Supreme Court does not merely express a viewpoint.
It declares a binding and more or less unchangeable rule of law.
This power can alter the background against which further consideration of the issue takes place, giving to the Court's position
the advantage that necessarily flows from advocating the status
quo. 1 Ironically, much of the respect accorded to the Court's
pronouncements is likely to stem from the belief-however tenuous-that the Court does not make an independent moral judgment, but articulates a decision already implicit in the
Constitution. Even over the long term, then, the debate may be
rigged in advance on behalf of the conclusions of the judges.
Both the concrete and coercive nature of constitutional
adjudication and the consequent ability to skew opinions weaken
the claim that a non-rule-based method of interpreting the Constitution contributes more to the moral well-being of society
than it costs by introducing more uncertainty into the relations
between individuals and the state. The confusions it can cause
are far from theoretical; and the increase in moral knowledge it
promises is, at least, suspect.
To support the model of adjudication that Perry describes,
therefore, it is necessary to justify the special and privileged role
the courts will take in the constitutional-moral dialogue. The
doubts I have introduced are troublesome only if we mistrust the
capacity of the judges to move moral growth in the right direction. If the courts were somehow natural experts in resolving
these profound moral, political, and social problems, we would
be less disturbed by the power they have to impose their results
on litigants and others. Nor would we feel the value of moral
dialogue was tainted by the advantage they hold in determining
the relevant facts. We thus inevitably return to the choice posed
in Statesman. We will endure a great deal from the statesman so
long as we are convinced that he really does possess the royal
science. The Eleatic Stranger thought a properly qualified physician entitled to compel his patient, even by violence, to do that
which is good for him. "Nothing could be more unjust than for
51. See Maltz, supra note 50, at 380-81.
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the patient to whom such violence is applied, to charge the physician ... with unskillful conduct" 52 just because it contravenes
the rules the physician prescribed for use in his absence.
And so when the citizen, contrary to law and custom, is
compelled to do what is juster and better and nobler than he
did before, the last and most absurd thing which he could say
in objection to such violence, is that he has incurred disgrace3or
evil or injustice at the hands of those who compelled him.
But we will want to be quite sure that the physician is really
wiser than the medical treatises before we grant him the authority to compel us. We will want to be equally certain that our
governors are really wiser than the laws before we grant them
the authority to rule by their own moral lights.54 Abstract rules
are a second-best solution, clearly inferior to decision by one
possessed of the royal science. In the absence of such a statesman, however, "to appoint as the guardian of the laws someone
...caring

nothing about the written text... [acting] contrary to

it from motives of interest or favour, and without any claim to
'55
knowledge,-would...

be a still worse evil."

The appeal of Perry's model of judicial review, therefore,
depends, critically, on our view of the quality of our judges and
especially on our estimate of the men and women who serve on
the Supreme Court of the United States. How sure are we that
they possess the royal science, that they have special qualifications for the job of moral inquiry that justify their taking a privileged position in the moral discourse suggested? Even with the
most intelligent, committed, and skillful judges, the vesting of
that power comes with a significant cost in uncertainty. We
might bear those costs without complaint if we were confident
the judges had the capacity to edge us closer to moral knowledge. On the other hand, no one would tolerate such a grant of
power to officials about whose wisdom and prudence he entertained serious doubts.
Perry argues on two distinct grounds that the judges are
likely to possess characteristics that fit them for the crucial task
he would assign to them. The first focuses on the institutional
advantages of judges over other governmental actors. Among
these advantages is the "political insularity" that gives the judi52. Statesman, supra note 2, 296b, at 512.

53. Id. 296d, at 512.
54. See id. 299d, at 515.
55. Id. 300a, at 516.
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ciary a special "capacity to engage in the pursuit of politicalmoral knowledge... in a relatively disinterested manner. '56 In
addition, the courts get to see the moral questions presented in
the context of a concrete dispute that clarifies the general probFinally, judicial decisionmaking permits the
lem involved.
development of " 'a body of coherent and intelligible constitutional principle,'" appropriate to the kind of moral investigation
suggested. 8
The second ground of argument is empirical: the actual
results of recent constitutional adjudication (adjudication not
tied to the originally intended effect of the constitutional rules)
have led to a more just society. The interventions of the
Supreme Court on questions of freedom of expression, freedom
of religion, and racial equality have contributed to a doctrine
that is "on balance.., sounder than the doctrine we might have
59
had.",
Each of these contentions has some force, but there is no
need to respond to them at any length to show how controvertible they are. Indeed, the first two aspects of the claim of institutional advantage are somewhat at war with each other. If
judges' insulation from political pressure enables them to act
rationally and dispassionately, their exposure to the flesh and
blood details of actual controversies has the potential to tempt
them out of their role as articulators of impartial moral principles. Hard cases make bad law. Adjudication makes possible
the thoughtful accumulation of a systematic corpus of principle,
but that does not mean that judges will, in fact, seize that possibility. Anyone who has spent much time studying and attempting to teach the case law of the United States Supreme Court
knows that the search for coherence often ends in despair.
As for the suggestion that expansive judicial activity has, in
fact, led to moral progress, Perry acknowledges that it is plausible only if we confine examination to the "modem period."
That record, he argues, is more indicative of what courts are
likely to do in the foreseeable future. 60 He thus does not dispute
what many would conclude on looking at the influence of the
56. M. PERRY, supra note 15, at 147.
57. Id at 147-48 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 26 (2d ed.
1986)).
58. Id. at 148 (quoting P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART
& WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 82 (2d ed. 1973)).
59. Id. at 166.
60. Id. at 167.
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courts over the long run of American history, that the judiciary
has as often thwarted as facilitated the adoption and implementation of what are now thought to be more humane public policies. Perhaps the recent period really is different and represents
a secular change in the judges' attitudes and behavior. But some
sensitive and principled people find many of the modem decisions offensive on moral as well as political grounds. Our more
recent history may better predict the near-term future, but our
very proximity to it may also deprive us of the perspective necessary to evaluate it correctly.6 1
The picture of judicial activity that Michael Perry has
sketched out is, therefore, fraught with risk. It stakes everything
on the capacity of our judges, and particularly the justices of the
Supreme Court, to move us closer to the goal of moral knowledge. Even if we do not question the intelligence, good faith, or
responsibility of American judges, we may well ask whether
some other structure, one that assighs to the judges less power
and accords them less discretion, may not better serve our interests. Like the Eleatic Stranger, we may be pressed to a secondbest solution-the rule of law.
To prefer the rule of law, confining the role of judges in
constitutional adjudication to applying pre-existing positive
rules, is not necessarily to believe that moral consequences are
irrelevant to questions of law. Indeed, even people who share
Perry's general conviction about the possibility of right and
wrong answers to questions of political morality might well take
that position. That is because it may better conform to their
moral judgments about the best system of law for a society composed of people holding many sharply different understandings
of what constitutes a good life. In such a society it may be
impossible to secure agreement on matters of substantive morality. But in spite of these differences-perhaps precisely because
of the fears generated by them-there may be a general preference for restraining the coercive power of the state by demanding order, clarity, and predictability in the application of public
power. That result is made possible by impersonal, abstract, and
stable constitutional rules.
Perry's own account of the "contractualist" explanation of
coercive legal rules illuminates this argument for adjudication
61. For a critical evaluation of claims that the Supreme Court has contributed
positively to moral and political dialogue in the recent past, see Maltz, supra note 50, at
381-91.
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based on static, positive law. Perry recognizes that a system of
rules may be supported by some conception of the good shared
by people whose overall views may be in other respects widely
disparate. Adopting the terminology of John Rawls, he concludes that an "overlapping consensus" makes possible a modus
vivendi in a society encompassing a range of moral viewpoints.6 z
The broader the range of conceptions of the good, however, "the
thinner the system of rules,"' 63 because the overlapping consensus will be narrower. As such narrowing occurs, more and more
substantive moral judgments drop out of the system of rules supported. The values that remain-the potential basis of widespread agreement-are likely to be, in increasing proportion,
those less controversial, formal values that provide individuals
with assurance that they can know where the power of the state
begins and where it ends. Applying this phenomenon to the creation of constitutional rules, we would expect to end up with a
system that will vindicate a few fairly universally shared substantive values and the more formal but still critical values promoted by the rule of law.6 4

Any system of lawmaking that has the undefined potential
to generate coercive orders beyond this limited range will be too
risky for too many people. It portends too much in the way of
unacceptable moral judgments and too little in the clarity and
security that accompany the exercise of state power. It is perhaps dispiriting to exchange the promise of constant moral
growth for the authority of fixed and mindless rules that promote the more prosaic goals of certainty and safety-to abandon
hope for the royal science in favor of the second best of the rule
of law. But for this people,65 in this place and this time, maybe
that is the best we can do.

62. See M. PERRY, supra note 15, at 85-87 (discussing Rawls, Justice as Fairness:
PoliticalNot Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (1985), and Rawls, The Idea of an
Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987)); see also Rawls, The Priority
of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.251 (1988).
63. M. PERRY, supra note 15, at 85.
64. Lon Fuller referred to these formal values as collectively constituting the
"internal morality" of law. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94, 162-70, 18186 (rev. ed. 1969).
65. "After all, an aspect of trying to flourish, for those who inhabit the subjective
circumstances, is trying to locate mutually acceptable bases of accommodation with those
with whom we find ourselves in fundamental moral disagreement." M. PERRY, supra note
15, at 88.

